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Resumo: Este artigo tem por objetivo contribuir para o exame das 
implicações em termos da alocação de recursos e de bem-estar de uma 
eventual redução das barreiras tarifárias no mercado dos EUA de suco 
de laranja concentrado e congelado (FCOJ) importado do Brasil. Depois 
da introdução, uma segunda seção apresenta uma visão geral das 
principais características do mercado e do regime de comércio para o suco 
de laranja, bem como uma avaliação preliminar dos possíveis impactos 
da liberalização comercial dentro do quadro de acordos comerciais com 
o NAFTA e com a União Européia. A terceira seção descreve os modelos 
de equilíbrio parcial com bens substitutos utilizados para o exame dos 
impactos em termos de quantidades, preços e bem-estar da redução 
tarifária nos mercados de FCOJ dos EUA. A quarta seção apresenta dois 
possíveis cenários da liberalização comercial usando o modelo de «país 
grande». A última seção sumariza os principais resultados.
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Classificação JEL: F13
Abstract: This study aims at examining the resource allocation and 
welfare implications of the reduction of barriers in the United States 
market for Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice (FCOJ) imported from 
Brazil. The present paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an 
overview of the main features of the market and current trade regime 
for orange juice, as well as the possible impacts of liberalization within 
FTAA and with the European Union; section 3 describes the partial 
equilibrium model of imperfect substitute goods used to estimate the 
impact of trade liberalization in the United States, on prices and quantities 
and on welfare; in section 4 two possible scenarios for liberalization are 
designed using the large country model. The last section summarizes 
the main conclusions.
Key words: Commercial liberalization, reduction of trade barriers, 
partial equilibrium models, frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ).
JEL Classification: F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade 
Negotiations 
1. Introduction
Together, Brazil and the USA comprise over 90% of world output of 
orange juice. Both countries are large producers, but the Brazilians have 
reached levels of production costs that the US producers cannot match. 
Currently, Brazilian exports face high barriers in the USA, and this has 
led Brazil to lodge complaints at the WTO.
The combination of large efficiency gaps between producers 
and high barriers make the orange juice industry one of the loci of 
strong resistance to trade liberalization either in a MERCOSUR-NAFTA 
agreement or in FTAA.
As a matter of fact, the degree of support for or resistance to reductions 
in trade protection varies from sector to sector, depending on the gaps 
in competitiveness and on the existing levels of protection, among other 
factors. Sectors in which producers perceive competitive gaps as being 
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relatively small and where trade is already intense will probably resist 
liberalization less than other sectors. Sectors where competitive gaps are 
large and where trade barriers are currently high are natural candidates 
to show strong resistance. The sectoral perspective is therefore essential 
in order to identify potential business support for and/or resistance to 
further progress in current trade negotiations.
Thus, this study aims at examining the resource allocation and 
welfare implications of the lowering of barriers in the United States 
market for frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) imported from 
MERCOSUR, specifically from Brazil. 
The article is organized as follows: section 2 presents an overview 
of the main features of the market and current trade regime for orange 
juice, as well as the possible impacts of liberalization within FTAA and 
with the European Union; section 3 describes the partial equilibrium 
model of imperfect substitute goods used to estimate the impact of trade 
liberalization on domestic production in the United States, on prices 
and quantities and on welfare; in section 4 two possible scenarios for 
liberalization are designed using the version of a large country model. 
The last section summarizes the main conclusions.
2. Trade flows and trade policy
2.1. Supply and demand in the international market of FCOJ
The world market for fruit juice is very dynamic. Sales, which showed 
an average annual growth rate of 5%, reached $31 billion in 1998. 
Approximately half of that amount results from sales of orange juice.
World orange production is concentrated in four countries. Brazil 
is the major producer with about 27 thousand rural production units, 
and is responsible for 34% of world orange production and 47% of the 
total orange juice production. The USA is the second largest producer. 
Table 1 shows data on the principal producers of oranges and Frozen 
Concentrated Orange Juice in 1999/2000.
The Brazilian orange juice industry is acknowledged as being the 
most competitive in the world. Production costs in Brazil are lower 
than in other countries. The average productivity of the orange groves 
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in Brazil has grown 30% over the last decade, reaching 599 boxes per 
hectare in 2002, well above levels achieved in several countries.
Table 1 – Oranges and FCOJ main producers
Countries Orange* FCOJ**
Thousand Ton % Ton, 65° brix %
Brazil 15,953 33.9    1, 106,000 46.5
USA 11,980 25.5     1,064,102 44.8
México  3,100 6.6          44,000 1.9
Spain  2,828 6.2          45,500 1.9
Others 13,156 28.0        116,529 4.9
Total 47,017 100.0     2,376,131 100.0
Sources: *USDA – United States Department of Agriculture – World Horticultural trade & USA 
Export Opportunities – February 2001.
** National Agricultural Statistic Service and USA Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census. 
Florida Department of Citrus. Reports from USA Agricultural counselors and Attachés and/or 
USDA/FAS Estimates. 
However, it is important to point out that average farm productivity 
in Brazil is lower than in the USA. In Brazil, the yield is around 2 boxes 
(40.8kg)/tree, while in the USA it is around 3.5 boxes/tree. There are 
two main reasons for this: firstly, the area used in the USA is almost 
100% irrigated, which means increased land productivity; and secondly, 
the USA produces more Hamlin fruit than Brazil (53% of the USA 
area, against 13% in Brazil), this being a kind of orange that permits 
greater volume of juice production, although the quality of the juice 
is inferior. There are no significant differences in productivity between 
the Brazilian and US orange juice industries because the equipment 
used is the same.
Hence, the lower Brazilian production costs are not due to a higher 
productivity. The main reasons for the superior competitiveness of 
Brazilian orange juice production are smaller farm inputs, and lower 
land and labor (used for picking the oranges) costs.
The following table shows the compared structure of operational 
costs in Sao Paulo – the main Brazilian orange juice producing state 
– and Florida.
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Table 2 – Compared operational costs - Sao Paulo* and Florida**
Operational Costs Sao Paulo Florida
Insecticides 312. 59 51.01
Fungicides 53.83 104.83
Herbicides 12.60 230.73
Fertilizers 214.23 306.62
Operations 333.41 768.27
Irrigation 0.00 372.03
Labor 129.83 178.33
Cost ($/Ha) 1056.48 2011.82
Cost ($/box) 1.27 1.87
Source: Pozzan, M., Muraro, R. and Ueta, F.Z., “Realidades Distintas”, Agroanalysis, revista de 
Agronegócios da FVG, Agosto 2002. Brazilian data are collected by IEA – Instituto de Economia 
Agrícola, São Paulo State Department. Florida data were published in Budgeting Costs and Returns 
for Southeast Florida Citrus Production, 2000-2001, October 2001, UFL publication.
*2001/2002 harvest. ** 2000/2001 harvest
Operational costs are significantly higher in Florida than in Sao Paulo. 
Brazilian orange production does not utilize irrigation and involves 
lower labor costs (which also help to explain lower operation costs). 
In spite of being 90% higher than Sao Paulo’s operational costs when 
measured per hectare, Florida’s costs differ only 47% from Sao Paulo’s 
when measured per box. This is explained by the above-mentioned 
superior productivity per tree of Florida’s production.
Table 3 shows comparative picking and transportation costs for Sao 
Paulo and Florida orange production. It is clear that these are the main 
items responsible for the considerably higher orange production costs 
in Florida. There is a scarcity of local workers for the job and the severe 
government restrictions on hiring foreign workers raises the cost of 
labor, so the costs of orange picking and transportation in Florida are 
even greater than operational costs.
Table 3 – Compared picking and transportation costs – 
Sao Paulo* and Florida**
Sao Paulo Florida
Picking and loading 333.33 1,635.52
Freightage 125.00 570.28
Cost ($/Ha) 458.33 2,205.80
Cost ($/box) 0.55 2.05
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Source: Pozzan, M., Muraro, R. and Ueta, F.Z., “Realidades Distintas”, Agroanalysis, revista de 
Agronegócios da FVG, Agosto 2002. Brazilian data are collected by IEA – Instituto de Economia 
Agrícola, Sao Paulo State Department. Florida data were published in Budgeting Costs and Returns 
for Southeast Florida Citrus Production, 2000-2001, October 2001, UFL publication.
*2001/2002 harvest. ** 2000/2001 harvest
Finally, table 4 shows the comparison of a third important element 
in orange production costs in Sao Paulo and Florida: tax payments.
Table 4 – Compared tax  payments – Sao Paulo* and Florida**
Tax Payments Sao Paulo Florida
Property tax/Water Management 0.00 145.53
DOC assessment 0.00 175.00
Fundecitrus/Funrural/Senar 75.33 0.00
Total/Hectare ($) 75.33 320.53
Total/Box ($) 0.09 0.30
Source: Pozzan, M., Muraro, R. and Ueta, F.Z., “Realidades Distintas”, Agroanalysis, revista de 
Agronegócios da FVG, August 2002. Brazilian data are collected by IEA – Instituto de Economia 
Agrícola, Sao Paulo State Department. Florida data were published in Budgeting Costs and Returns 
for Southeast Florida Citrus Production, 2000-2001, October 2001, UFL publication.
*2001/2002 harvest. ** 2000/2001 harvest
The most important differences have to do with property, water 
management and DOC assessment1 taxes; these are not paid by Brazilian 
producers but they are a heavy burden in Florida. Brazilian taxes on 
rural property and to the Citric Producers Association together only add 
$0.09 per box to the total cost.
In spite of operating with much lower productivity per tree, Brazilian 
orange producers have huge cost advantages over producers in Florida. 
The most important factors are operational differences in the cost of 
picking and transportation, which are mostly due to different prices for 
labor. This is why, in 2001/2002, with prices per box of $3.54, Florida 
producers faced a loss of $0.68 per box, while Brazilian producers, with 
sale prices of $2.75, made a profit of $0.84 per box. Florida producers 
are investing heavily in picking mechanization in order to reduce that 
cost disadvantage, but results will not immediately be apparent. 2
1 Tax paid to the Citrus Department for local citric product marketing.
2 The reaction of Florida producers may possibly erode the competitive advantage of 
Brazilian supply, largely based on low labour costs.
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Table 5 – Compared total production costs – Sao Paulo* and Florida**
Production Costs
São Paulo Florida
US$ (%) US$ (%)
Operational Costs 1, 056.48 66.44 2,011.82 44.33
Picking and Transp. Costs 458.33 28.82 2, 205.80 48.61
Taxes 75.33 4.74 320,53 7.06
Total (US$/Ha) 1590.14 100.00 4538.15 100.00
Total (US$/Box) 1.91 _________ 4.22 _________
Total (US$/Plant) 4.77 _________ 16.38 _________
Source: Pozzan, M., Muraro, R. and Ueta, F.Z., “Realidades Distintas”, Agroanalysis, revista de 
Agronegócios da FVG, Agosto 2002. Brazilian data are collected by IEA – Instituto de Economia 
Agrícola, Sao Paulo State Department. Florida data were published in Budgeting Costs and Returns 
for Southeast Florida Citrus Production, 2000-2001, October 2001, UFL publication.
*2001/2002 harvest.
** 2000/2001 harvest
Brazilian orange juice producers have used their cost advantages to 
become important players in world trade. Brazil is the absolute leader 
in FCOJ world exports. 80% of FCOJ world exports (which amounted to 
1.4 million metric tons in 2001) are Brazilian. Table 6 shows the volume 
of FCOJ exported by the main international trade players. 
Table 6 – FCOJ exports (thousand metric tons, 65° brix)
Countries 1997/1998 1999/2000 2000/2001
Brazil 1,295 1,240 1,185
USA   196   100     95
Spain    56     73     21
Mexico    45     37     33
Italy    28     31     30
Others    24     30     25
Total 1,554 1,511 1,389
Source: Agrianual, 2002
Orange products are an important item in Brazilian exports and make 
a significant contribution to earnings of hard currency. Table 7 shows 
the share of orange products in total Brazilian exports, in 2000/2001 
and 2001/2002. In 2000/2001, orange products contributed 2% of the 
total value of Brazilian exports. It is worth noticing that 93.6% of total 
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orange products are FCOJ. In 2001/2002, despite the fact that the volume 
of orange product exports in general (and of FCOJ in particular) grew, 
the share of those products in total exports, in value terms, went down 
(from 2% to 1.6%). The fall in the international price for FCOJ helps to 
explain this. Indeed, FCOJ has been facing low quotations, high stocks 
and excess of supply in recent years.  
Table 7 – Brazilian exports of orange products
                            2000/2001                                            2001/2002                      
Product
Value
($1000,  FOB)
Volume
(Tons)
Value
($1000,  FOB)
Volume
(Tons)
Total Brazilian Exports 55,085,600 - 58,222,642 -
FCOJ 1,033,646 1,276.86.8      845,094 1,348.2
Fresh orange   15,248      75.8     27,538 139.6
Pulpwash   38,308     557.7    61, 925 1,020.4
Essential Orange Oil   17,469 17.7     23,392 26.6
Orange Products  1,104, 671 1,927.5     957,949 2,534.8
Source: CONAB, Feb/2002
The European Union is the main market for Brazilian FCOJ exports. 
Exports to Europe amount to 69% of the total, and the USA market accounts 
for the another 21% of Brazilian FCOJ exports. The share of the US market 
fell during the 90s as a result of competition from Mexican exports, which 
benefited from lower barriers established within the NAFTA agreement. 
Table 8 shows the destination of Brazilian FCOJ exports.
Table 8 – Brazilian FCOJ exports - 2000/2001
EU NAFTA ASIA OTHERS TOTAL
Tons 845,781 264,674 99,176 24,643 1,234,274
Share (%) 68.5 21.4 8.0 2.1 100.0
Source: Abecitrus
Finally, it should be added that Brazilian imports of orange products 
are almost nil. In 2001, these imports were only $1.4 million and 1.1 
million tons. Orange essential oils amount to 65% of the value of 
orange product imports. Brazil is therefore the leading net exporter 
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country in the orange juice market, and about one fifth of its exports 
go the USA market.
The USA is the largest market for orange juice and the second largest 
producer. USA producers export part of their output, mainly to Europe, 
but domestic consumption requires imports of FCOJ, mainly from Brazil 
and from Mexico. In 2001, USA were responsible for 41.3% and 33.6% of 
world-wide FCOJ imports, in terms of quantity and value, respectively. 
Overall, the trade balance for orange juice in the USA is negative.
Lastly, table 9 shows the countries of origin of US FCOJ imports. 
For the purposes of this study, the most important point to note is the 
importance of Brazil as a source of the USA’s FCOJ imports. Mexico 
is also an important player, and, as mentioned above, it has benefited 
from import tax reductions within NAFTA. 
Table 9 – USA orange juice imports: main countries of origin: Jan-Dec 2001
         Countries                        Value*  ($) Participation (%)
Brazil 115,071,979 50.90
Costa Rica 39,897,513 17.65
Mexico 39,827,249 17.62
Honduras 5,302,565 2.34
Canada 4,214,873 1.86
Others 21,759,462 9.60
Total 226,073,641 100
Source: Florida Department of Citrus
*FOB cost of product
2.2. FCOJ protection in MERCOSUR and the USA
MERCOSUR´s common external tariff (CET) for orange juice is currently 
15%. However, given the high competitiveness of Brazilian production, 
tariff protection is not really necessary to prevent imports of orange 
products. This means that the lowering of tariffs can be used by Brazil as 
an important bargaining instrument in current trade negotiations.
On the other hand, in the European Union, the tariff applied to FCOJ 
imports originating from Brazil is around 35%. Brazil also faces high 
trade barriers on its FCOJ exports to the US market. FCOJ imported 
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from Brazil faces barriers in the form of a per unit tax equivalent to a 
56.7% ad valorem tax.
It may be useful to explain how per unit tax adopted by the USA 
is translated into a percentage of the price of FCOJ, or into an ad
valorem tax. The ad valorem tax imposed by the USA on the orange 
juice imported from Brazil is calculated from the per unit tax levied on 
the reconstituted orange juice. In the American market, per unit tax is 
$0.0785 per liter of reconstituted orange juice ready for consumption. 
This tax does not change when there are fluctuations in the prices of the 
product, therefore its ad valorem equivalent is higher when prices are 
low. The calculation of the ad valorem equivalent factor is based on two 
parameters: 1) the average price of orange juice, and 2) the conversion 
factor of concentrated for reconstituted juice. In this study, Hemispheric 
Database/FTAA V.1.0. parameters were adopted, generating an ad
valorem equivalent factor of 56.7% for FCOJ.
In addition, in the State of Florida, the Brazilian product had 
to pay another excise tax of 0.027 dollars per gallon ($40/ton) as 
an equalization tax. The tax imposed by the State of Florida was 
challenged in court by importers, and as a result, in April 2002, the 
Florida Citrus Commission was ordered to propose a remedy in the 
equalization tax case. The court ruled that the equalization tax was 
unconstitutional because it illegally discriminated against foreign 
citrus products imported into Florida while exempting juice products 
imported from other states, mainly from California. As a result of 
the court’s ruling, the Florida legislature abolished tax exemption for 
domestic juice, with the new law taking effect in July 2002. Brazil 
asked for consultations under the WTO, and discussions were opened 
between Brazilian and US officials.
Brazilian FCOJ competes directly with Mexican exports in the USA 
market. The FCOJ imports from Mexico pay taxes equivalent to a 30.7% 
ad valorem tax.
The most probable outcome of barrier reductions resulting from 
negotiations within FTAA and/or with the European Union would be 
an increase in international prices and an increase in FCOJ imports. 
The impact of liberalization should be different in the European 
market and in the USA. The European market is already saturated, and 
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Brazil accounts for almost all FCOJ imports in that continent. On the 
other hand, in the USA market there will be room for a considerable 
increase in the Brazilian share of FCOJ sales, after US and Mexican 
output adjust to the new situation. 
Overall, the global market for FCOJ can be considered as a textbook 
case of the impact of trade barriers on output, on trade and on international 
price formation. In particular, a reduction in the trade barriers faced by 
Brazilian exporters in the North American FCOJ market would induce 
an increase in international prices and imports. As a result, Brazilian 
exporters would benefit from higher prices and from an increase in their 
share of the American market.3 These issues will be addressed in the 
sections below, in a simulation using a partial equilibrium model.
3. The theoretical model and methodological aspects
3.1. Overview of the partial equilibrium approach
In order to calculate the welfare and distributional effects of a 
reduction in trade barriers in the American FCOJ market, and, for our 
purposes, the potential rise in Brazilian FCOJ exports to the USA, a 
version of Hufbauer and Elliot’s4 partial equilibrium model of imperfect 
substitutes with perfect competitive markets is used.
Compared to computable general equilibrium models, the partial 
equilibrium models have two evident advantages: they are less complex 
and more transparent. Moreover, when the goal is the treatment of a 
single market at a very detailed level, a partial equilibrium model is 
often the only feasible way to proceed. 
The different generations of partial equilibrium models share at least 
two common assumptions. 
Firstly, in a partial equilibrium model, the impact of a change 
in the market under investigation is assumed not to disturb related 
3 Moreover, in the short run, following an increase in international prices in the American 
market, one can imagine that part of Brazil’s FCOJ production to the EU markets would 
drift to the USA. Therefore, the FCOJ international price in EU markets would increase as 
a consequence of the supply shortage, and this would benefit Brazilian exporters.
4 Hufbauer, G.C. and K.A. Elliot (1994).
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markets. However, this is not to say that the related markets are 
solemnly ignored. As Francois (1997) rightly stated, the price elasticity 
of demand included in these models is conceived to reflect underlying 
linkages between related markets, even though in the implementation 
of a partial equilibrium model such linkages are sterilized.
Secondly, in a partial equilibrium model, the income effects that 
arise from a trade policy change are not considered. As a consequence, 
the demand functions used in these models are represented as being 
dependent only on prices and not on income, which is treated as an 
exogenous variable. 
Broadly speaking, partial equilibrium models can be classified 
according to: a) the degree of substitutability of the domestic and 
imported good; b) the specification of the import supply function; c) the 
choice of implementation of the model in a linear or non-linear form.
The first distinction divides partial equilibrium models according to 
the degree of substitutability of the domestically produced and imported 
good in perfect substitutes and imperfect substitutes models.
On the one hand, in the less complex perfect substitutes model, 
the imported and domestic goods are considered to be perfectly 
homogeneous from the consumers’ point of view. In this case, the 
import demand function is simply defined as the difference between 
consumption and domestic production, and therefore all the analysis is 
conducted in the import market. Nevertheless, as suggested by Bowen 
(1998), in spite of the attractiveness of these models, the assumption of 
perfect substitutes is generally not consistent with empirically estimated 
values of the price elasticity of demand.
On the other hand, in the imperfect substitutes model, the domestic 
and imported goods are considered to be non homogeneous in the eyes 
of the consumer. The practical consequence of this notion is that in these 
models there are two different demand functions, one for the domestically 
produced good and another for the imported good, both dependent on 
the internal prices of the domestic and imported goods. Therefore, when 
analyzing the impact of the reduction in tariffs, it is necessary to take into 
account the repercussion in the two connected markets.
The second important distinction in the context of partial 
equilibrium models has its roots in the assumption of the importance 
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of the foreign exporter country. If the exporter is a big player in the 
domestic and international market, it is tempting to assume that its 
supply schedule is flat, i.e. perfectly elastic. Such a model is known 
as a small country model because it is understood that the importer 
country is unable to influence the prices of the imported good. In 
contrast, in a large country model, it is assumed that the importer 
country is large and therefore able to influence the prices of goods on 
world markets. If this is the case, the import supply function will be 
positively sloped, and thus the magnitude of the change in world price 
and volume of imports will depend significantly on the elasticity of 
foreign export supply. 
Finally, the last difference between partial equilibrium models has 
to do with the particular mode of their computational implementation. 
Generally, the functions used in these models are supposed to have 
constant elasticity. All that has to be done is to solve the system 
of equations for prices and then use the solution to solve them for 
quantities.
If a linear approximation is chosen, all the equations can be easily 
derived in log form. This results in a simpler procedure to solve the 
problem. However, as Francois & Hall (1997) pointed out, using a 
linear model, even in a single market, leads to a linearization error that 
becomes larger when policy changes are significant.
The alternative procedure is to solve the equations in prices and 
quantities in a non-linear system, i.e. without using the equations in log 
form. Although in this way the linearization error is minimized, the price 
to be paid for this is a higher degree of computational complexity.
3.2. The structure and implementation of large country models
The next two sections form an introduction to the structure and 
procedures of implementation of a partial equilibrium of a large country 
model. The main hypotheses, equations and variables are presented in 
the first section. Moreover, this section offers a graphic exposition in the 
markets under analysis of the standard procedures of welfare evaluation 
effects. The second section introduces the steps for estimating elasticities 
and the calibration of parameters.
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3.2.1. Large country models
The implementation of a large country model is very similar to that 
of small country model. The main difference resides in the assumption 
that the importer country is large and hence able to influence the 
prices of goods on world markets. If this is the case, the supply 
function of the imported good will be positively sloped and therefore 
the magnitude of the change in world price and volume of imports 
will depend significantly on the price elasticity of the supply of the 
imported good. 
The system of equations is summarized below. The domestically 
produced good and its imported substitute are designated by the indexes 
d and m.
where dD  and mD  are the quantities consumed of good d and m
respectively; dS  and mS  are, respectively, the quantities produced of 
good d and m; dp  and mp are the internal prices of good d and m;
is the own-price elasticity of demand of good d; is the cross-price 
elasticity of demand of good d in relation to good m; sE  is the price 
elasticity of supply of good d;  is the own-price elasticity of demand 
of good m;  is the cross-price elasticity of demand of good m in 
relation to good d;  is the price elasticity of supply of good m;  p* is
the world export price; t is the level of tariffs.
The first three equations of the model define demand and 
supply functions and the equilibrium condition in the market of 
the domestically produced good. The fourth equation expresses the 
internal price of the imported good. The last three equations represent 
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demand and supply functions and the equilibrium condition in the 
market of the imported good. 
This system of seven independent equations can be easily solved to generate 
values for seven endogenous variables,  .and,*,,,, mmmddd SDPPPSD
A change in the level of the tariff allows the calculation of the new endogenous 
variables. Needless to say, if the exercise imposes a complete elimination 
of the initial tariff, the value of the final internal price of the imported good 
( 'mp ) will be equal to the price received by the importer ( '*p ) and in this 
case, the fourth equation is redundant. 
It is important to say that for the implementation of this model it is 
crucial to know the values of all exogenous variables, i.e. the elasticities 
and initial quantities of domestic production and import, and the 
internal prices of the domestic and imported good.
The following graph represents the market for the imported good 
and the modifications that occur once the tariff is altered. 
Graph 1. Effects of removing a trade barrier in the market 
of the imported good
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Equilibrium is achieved at point E when the trade barrier is placed at 
its initial value. Since the supply curve is now upward, a wedge appears 
between the internal price and the price obtained by the exporter in this 
market, respectively *and ppm .
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When the tariff is completely eliminated, the subsequent decrease 
in the price of the imported good induces a fall in the demand schedule 
in the market for the domestically produced good. The modifications in 
terms of prices, quantities and welfare in the market for the domestically 
produced good are the same as before.
Conversely, the consequent decline in the price of the domestic 
good causes a shift to the left of and below the demand schedule of the 
imported good represented in graph 1, by the new demand schedule 
Dm’. The final outcome is an increase in quantity, and the same price for 
the exporter and for the American consumer. This new price prevailing 
for both the exporter and the American consumer will lie between the 
initial prices *and ppm .
The final step involves understanding how to compute the welfare 
effects in the market for imported good using graph 1. 
Once the importer country influences prices on world markets, 
the impact in terms of welfare of a tariff reduction will be distributed 
between three agents: consumers, government and foreign exporters. 
With the complete elimination of a tariff (the analysis is similar 
when the tariff is partially reduced), consumers gain with lower prices 
and larger quantities. The consumer surplus equals the area of the 
trapezium .'*,',, 1 pEEpm  Exporters will also benefit from higher 
prices and increased quantities, and their surplus can be measured 
by the area of the trapezium *,,','* 2 pEEp . Finally, the government 
loses tariff revenues equal to the area of the rectangle *,,, 21 pEEpm .
3.2.2. Estimation of elasticities and calibration of parameters
In the literature, the lack of estimates for all the elasticities needed 
could pose a serious problem in the implementation of a partial equilibrium 
model. Nevertheless, this difficulty may be overcome if at least some data 
is available. In the case of FCOJ, the price elasticity of aggregate demand 
for imports and the domestic good combined, as well as the elasticity of 
substitution between the domestic and imported products are available 
in the seminal work by Hufbauer and Elliot (1994). Assuming that the 
demand structure is of the CES form, the estimates of the own-price 
elasticities of demand may be obtained using the following equations:
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where 1S  is the share in volume of the domestic product in 
consumption and 2S  is the share by quantity of imports in consumption; 
S  is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and imported 
good; TE  is the price elasticity of total demand.
After calculating the values of the own-price elasticities of demand, 
the cross-price elasticities in the CES case can be obtained following a 
methodology proposed by Tarr (1990):
Once all the elasticities are obtained, the next step can be taken. 
The calibration of the model consists in calculating the values of the 
constants  in equations (1), (2), (5) and (6). The 
procedure for calculating the constants is easily performed with the 
initial values of quantities and prices assuming that the start situation 
expresses an undistorted equilibrium. 
Finally, when this task is completed, the model is ready to be 
implemented.
4. Results
In order to estimate the impact of tariff reductions in the American 
FCOJ market in terms of resource allocation and welfare implications, a 
partial equilibrium model of imperfect substitutes are used, considering the 
domestic American FCOJ market a large country. The results are presented 
in the next section. Besides, two different scenarios for the evaluation of 
the impact of liberalization in the US FCOJ market were constructed. 
The first scenario investigates the effects of a complete elimination 
of the per unit tax equivalent to a 56.7% ad valorem tax. The second 
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scenario evaluates the impact of a partial reduction in the ad valorem
tax to the same level as that applicable on Mexican exports of FCOJ 
to the USA. The second scenario is considered to be far more realistic 
because by joining the FTAA, Brazil will most probably benefit more 
from the same market access conditions than Mexico.
The following table summarizes the initial values of prices and quantities 
in the years 1999-2000, and the values of all relevant elasticities. 
Table 10 – Initial prices, quantities and elasticities
Prices and elasticities Values
Import price of FCOJ (dollars/ton – 1999-2000) * 1,350
Domestic price of FCOJ (dollars/ton – 1999-2000) * 1,350
Quantity of domestically produced good (ton – 1999-2000) * 1,064,102
Quantity of imports of FCOJ from Brazil (ton – 1999-2000) * 252,398
Price elasticity of domestic supply ** 1.0
Price elasticity of total demand ** 0.5
Own-price elasticity of demand for the domestically produced good *** -0.8643
Own-price elasticity of demand for the imported good *** -2.0357
Cross-price elasticity of demand for the domestically produced good in 
relation to imported good ***
0.3643
Cross-price elasticity of demand for the imported good in relation to 
domestically produced good ***
1.5358
Elasticity of substitution between the domestic and imported good ** 2.4
Sources: * Neves and Marino (2002); **.Hufbauer and Elliot (1994); *** Authors´ calculation.
It is important to point out that in this study, the domestic FCOJ price 
is considered to be the same as the import price, tariffs included. This 
is because FCOJ is a relatively homogeneous good, which is extensively 
traded in commodity markets. Hence, both the domestic and the import 
price are simply the price of FCOJ in commodity markets.
  Table 11 summarizes the results in the scenario of the complete 
elimination from the FCOJ market of the per unit tax equivalent to a 
56.7% ad valorem tax, with the estimate of the welfare effects and the 
percentage changes in prices and quantities caused by the elimination 
of tariffs. It is important to note that in this study, as a means of 
comparison, simulations are performed by adopting four different 
values for the export supply price elasticity of the imported good. In the 
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following table, columns A, B, C and D present the results when this 
elasticity is equal to 0.5, 1, 2 and 3 respectively.5
Table 11 – Scenario I - Complete elimination of the 56.7% 
tariff in the FCOJ market
Welfare effects
Values (in millions of dollars)
A B C D
Consumer surplus gain 63.32 104.74 156.12 186.91
Producer surplus loss 27.65 44.64 64.42 75.59
Tariff revenue loss 123.29 123.29 123.29 123.29
Efficiency gain -87.62 -63.19 -31.60 -11.97
Efficiency gain / Sales of the imported good (%) * 25.71 18.55 9.27 3.51
Welfare of the exporter 99.37 83.52 63.53 51.34
Change in the price of the domestic good (%) -1.94 -3.16 -4.59 -5.41
Change in the price of the imported good (%) -9.56 -15.14 -21.37 -24.76
Change in the quantity of domestic good (%) -1.94 -3.16 -4.59 -5.41
Change in the quantity of imported good (%) 19.05 32.97 51.80 63.86
Change in the export price (%) 41.72 32.97 23.21 17.89
* Sales of  the imported good are measured in the initial situation, before liberalization. This value 
is calculated by multiplying the initial price of the imported good by the quantity of imports.
Table 12 shows the welfare effects and percentage changes in prices 
and quantities in the scenario of a partial reduction of barriers to levels 
equivalent to a 30% ad valorem tax. It is worth to note that the impacts 
of a reduction in tariffs are losses of welfare in the local economy, except 
in the case of a partial reduction of the tariff when the export supply 
price elasticity of the imported good is equal to 3. The reason for this 
is straightforward. When the importer country has the power to affect 
5 A recent IPEA´s paper is devoted to estimating the supply export functions of several 
Brazilian agricultural products. However, specifically in the case of orange juice, the 
coefficients of the variables for explaining export quantities (export prices, the real 
exchange rate, and real Brazilian income) were not found to be statistically significant 
at a 10% probability level. According to the authors, this is due to the sector’s main 
characteristics: the extremely rigid market structure, where supply is organized on the 
basis of formal contracts between agricultural producers and industry; the high degree 
of market concentration, both on the seller’s and on the buyer’s side; and the fact that 
most FCOJ exporters are also traders that deal in the product in foreign markets. This 
does not mean that the supply export function is necessarily price inelastic. On the 
contrary, it is reasonable to conjecture that the model utilized by the authors does not 
fit that specific market, suggesting that further studies on this topic may be useful.
RER, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 45, nº 04, p. 855-877, out/dez 2007 – Impressa em novembro 2007
874 P Impacts of a liberalization in the USA market for Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice: 
 why Florida´s producers are so afraid?
the world prices, the taxes imposed in the market of imported good are 
partially paid by the exporter country. So, in the scenario of complete 
elimination of tariffs, the government loses all its revenue, part of which 
is driven to the foreign exporter country.6
Table 12 – Scenario II - Partial reduction of the tariff in the FCOJ 
market to the level of 30%
Welfare effects
Values (in millions of dollars)
A B C D
Consumer surplus gain 26.10 42.82 63.03 74.82
Producer surplus loss 11.63 18.91 27.53 32.46
Tariff revenue loss 42.21 40.61 38.66 37.51
Efficiency gain -27.74 -16.70 -3.16 4.85
Efficiency gain / Sales of the imported good (%) * 8.14 4.90 0.93 1.42
Welfare of the exporter 35.21 29.08 21.58 17.17
Change in the price of the domestic good (%) -0.81 -1.33 -1.94 -2.29
Change in the price of the imported good (%) -4.09 -6.60 -9.52 -11.16
Change in the quantity of domestic good (%) -0.81 -1.33 -1.94 -2.29
Change in the quantity of imported good (%) 7.52 12.58 18.96 22.80
Change in the export price (%) 15.61 12.58 9.07 7.09
* Sales of  the imported good are measured in the initial situation, before liberalization. This value 
is calculated by multiplying the initial price of the imported good by the quantity of imports.
The final result in terms of national welfare depends on comparing 
the government’s losses and the gains incorporated by consumers. As a 
matter of fact, with unchanged price elasticity of total demand, the more 
elastic the supply of the imported good, the smaller the government’s 
losses will be and the larger the consumer surplus. There is always a 
critical point in terms of the elasticity of supply of the imported good 
when the losses turn into gains in terms of welfare. 
5. Conclusions
The analysis of the potential impact of trade liberalization suggests 
that strong resistance to trade liberalization is bound to arise in the US 
6 Graphs 1 and 2 in the appendix show the principal results in terms of welfare and 
changes in prices and quantities in the scenarios of partial and complete elimination 
of tariffs with two different elasticity values: 0.5 and 2.0 (cases A and D, respectively).
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FCOJ market. Even in the scenario where trade liberalization maintains 
the levels of protection currently applied to Mexican exports, the 
Brazilian producers’ cost advantages would result in a sharp fall in 
prices and, consequently, in domestic producers’ losses. 
Moreover, tariff reduction will cause losses of welfare in the local 
economy. As explained above, when the importer country affects world 
prices, a tariff reduction represents a transfer of revenue from local 
government to foreign producers. Thus, in this case, the more inelastic 
the supply of the imported good or the greater the tariff reduction, the 
larger the exporter’s welfare gain will be. 
It is important to point out that the results in terms of welfare and 
changes in prices and quantities are very sensitive to elasticity values. 
Although this could be thought of as a weakness in partial equilibrium 
models, they are still a very important tool for evaluating alternative 
commercial policies. The great sensitivity of these models with regard 
to elasticity values also suggests that further sectoral studies that 
emphasize estimating the elasticities utilized in this kind of model 
would be valuable.  
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction to this article, sectors in 
which domestic producers perceive competitive gaps as being relatively 
large, and where trade barriers are currently high, are natural candidates 
to show strong resistance to trade liberalization. This seems certainly 
to be the case for the FCOJ market in the USA. Anticipating such 
resistance, Brazilian producers have been investing in the US market, 
building orange juice processing capacity to become large buyers 
of both domestically produced and imported FCOJ. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is seen by Brazilian producers as an alternative way 
of circumventing trade barriers and entering the US market. FDI in this 
sector seems to demonstrate that Brazilian FCOJ producers do expect 
strong resistance to trade liberalization from their US counterparts.
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7. Appendix – Results
Graph 1
Graph 2
Recebido em março de 2006 e revisto em outubro de 2006.
